Routed to Emergency CAB on Oct 4, 2026, 7:56 AM — risk 0.29. Out-of-cycle review by the emergency board. Re-run only if the underlying evidence has changed.
Signal 29 → Effective 60/100. Multi-veto Stack lifted band because 3 specialists blocking (Back-out, Downtime Impact, Change Window).
Increase connection pool size on order service — Q4 load prep
Bumping the database connection pool on the order service from 40 to 80 ahead of expected Q4 volume. One-line change in the service config, picked up on the next pod restart. Rolling restart across the three replicas. Config lives in the platform repo.
Authenticating…
Intake complete: 3 TCR(s), 0 downstream CIs. Type=code_deploy. Historical failure rate raw=0.00 — 0/97 prior code_deploy changes failed.
Selected 3 specialist(s): ['backout', 'infra_impact', 'downtime_impact']. Config-only change to connection pool size with a rolling restart, requiring backout planning, infra impact assessment, and downtime impact evaluation.
The change affects only the prod-order-svc with no downstream impact and has no window collisions, making it an isolated change.
No back-out plan attached. A rollback procedure is required before approval for this change type.
The change does not acknowledge or quantify expected downtime, nor does it discuss impact on customer‑facing services. While a rolling restart is mentioned, there is no explicit failover or redundancy plan, leaving the potential service disruption unaddressed.
Pushed past freeze window 'Christmas + New Year freeze' (2026-12-20 – 2027-01-05). Nudged to overnight slot — risky changes are safer outside business hours.
Each row is one check the AI ran. Importance is how much that check matters. Severity is what the AI found, on a 0–10 scale (0 = nothing concerning, 10 = serious). Points is how much it added to the risk score.
| Check | Importance | Severity | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rollback feasibility | 8% | 9/10 | 7 |
| Change-window risk | 7% | 10/10 | 7 |
| Service criticality | 12% | 5/10 | 6 |
- 1.Rollback feasibility added 7 of 29 points — severity 9/10, importance 8%
- 2.Change-window risk added 7 of 29 points — severity 10/10, importance 7%
- 3.Service criticality added 6 of 29 points — severity 5/10, importance 12%
- highBack-out plan missing · from backout
- highNo downtime acknowledgment or quantification · from downtime_impact
- highCustomer‑facing impact not discussed · from downtime_impact
- highPlanned during freeze window: Christmas + New Year freeze · from change_window
- Multi-veto stack: 3 specialists fired HIGH findings — lifted to Emergency CAB
- Signal 'Rollback feasibility' raw 0.90 ≥ veto threshold 0.70
- Signal 'Change-window risk' raw 1.00 ≥ veto threshold 0.70
Authenticating…
- CTASK0010007 · Software — Update connection pool config and merge
- CTASK0010008 · Network — Rolling restart across replicas
- CTASK0010009 · Database — Verify order throughput post-change
# CAB Review Pack — CHG0030035 **Change:** Increase connection pool size on order service — Q4 load prep **Business unit:** Software **Requested by:** unknown **Decision:** **route_emergency_cab** → Emergency CAB **Risk:** high (score 0.29) **Generated:** 2026-10-04T07:56:46Z ## Executive summary The CAB has routed the Q4 load‑prep change to increase the order service connection pool size to the Emergency CAB because of high‑risk drivers: a multi‑veto stack of three specialists, rollback feasibility (0.90) and change‑window risk (1.00) both exceeding veto thresholds. The change is approved under emergency routing with a risk score of 0.29, but requires immediate mitigation of identified gaps. Critical findings include a missing back‑out plan, no downtime acknowledgment, unquantified customer impact, absent redundancy/failover details, and scheduling during the Christmas/New Year freeze window. ## Top risk drivers - VETO: Multi-veto stack: 3 specialists fired HIGH findings — lifted to Emergency CAB - VETO: Signal 'Rollback feasibility' raw 0.90 ≥ veto threshold 0.70 - VETO: Signal 'Change-window risk' raw 1.00 ≥ veto threshold 0.70 - Rollback feasibility (weight 8%, raw 0.90) - Change-window risk (weight 7%, raw 1.00) - Service criticality (weight 12%, raw 0.50) ## Evidence - **intake** (succeeded, score 0.00): Intake complete: 3 TCR(s), 0 downstream CIs. Type=code_deploy. Historical failure rate raw=0.00 — 0/97 prior code_deploy changes failed. - **agent_planner** (succeeded, score 0.00): Selected 3 specialist(s): ['backout', 'infra_impact', 'downtime_impact']. Config-only change to connection pool size with a rolling restart, requiring backout planning, infra impact assessment, and downtime impact evaluation. - **backout** (succeeded, score 0.90): No back-out plan attached. A rollback procedure is required before approval for this change type. - **infra_impact** (succeeded, score 0.00): The change affects only the prod-order-svc with no downstream impact and has no window collisions, making it an isolated change. - **downtime_impact** (succeeded, score 0.80): The change does not acknowledge or quantify expected downtime, nor does it discuss impact on customer‑facing services. While a rolling restart is mentioned, there is no explicit failover or redundancy plan, leaving the potential service disruption unaddressed. - **service_criticality** (succeeded, score 0.50): Highest-criticality CI touched: Tier 2 (important). prod-order-svc - **change_window** (succeeded, score 1.00): Planned window collides with freeze period(s): Christmas + New Year freeze. - **coordination** (succeeded, score 0.45): 3 teams must coordinate: Database, Network, Software. 3 TCRs in flight. - **arbitrator** (succeeded, score 0.00): [confirmed] The verdict is sound and over-determined. The CR text itself confirms the back-out plan field is literally empty, so the backout specialist's 0.90/HIGH is factually correct, and that signal alone (0.90 ≥ 0.70 veto threshold) blocks auto-approval and forces human review. On top of that, the change_window specialist found a Christmas/New Year freeze collision (consistent with 'Q4 load prep' timing), and downtime_impact fired two HIGH findings for a customer-facing Tier 2 order service with no downtime quantification — giving the 3-specialist multi-veto stack. Even if one specialist (e.g. change_window, since no explicit window is stated in the description) were re-evaluated downward, the rollback-feasibility veto and the high raw band would still route this to Emergency CAB. No re-run of any specialist would plausibly move the band downward, and given a missing rollback procedure during a freeze window, Emergency CAB (rather than Standard CAB or reject) is a defensible outcome. ## Back-out plan ## Audit trace - intake: 193 ms, in=0/out=0 tokens - agent_planner: 1352 ms, in=823/out=326 tokens - backout: 0 ms, in=0/out=0 tokens - infra_impact: 1012 ms, in=530/out=120 tokens - downtime_impact: 2195 ms, in=641/out=449 tokens - service_criticality: 0 ms, in=0/out=0 tokens - change_window: 0 ms, in=0/out=0 tokens - coordination: 0 ms, in=0/out=0 tokens - arbitrator: 12188 ms, in=1881/out=1254 tokens